@11 on Wednesday, 10 May, 2000
Brewer + �
first seminar
appear contradictory
= seems equivalent to:
no purely psychological laws
no psycho-physical laws (on which Davidson concentrates in Mental Events)
�strict� = very important. There may be important regularities linking mental-mental (e.g. decision theory) or mental-physical
but these regularities aren�t exceptionless, free from caveats and ceteris paribus
the paper is an attempt to make these three principles compatible
the key: distinction between events and their descriptions
between real things + their causal efficacy, and the way we describe them
can accept all 3, if accept that at least some mental events have physical descriptions, i.e. are both mental + physical
e.g. picking up my pen = neurons firing
then, the laws under which causal relationships have to be subsumable can be purely physical � don�t need psycho-physical laws, and the 3 principles are consistent
any mental events that enter into causal relationships with the physical can also (the same event) be described as physical
e.g.������������ my decision: to buy tomato puree
causes: a set of movements which constitutes a journey to the corner shop
(complicated, because not relating single events)
there is no law (all decisions to buy tomato puree result in set of movements of physical type P)
but there is a more complicated law relating the physical event N (neurological description of my decision to buy tomato puree) to (set of movements of physical type P)
all events of physical type N cause events of physical type P
each object/event is a particular of a type � laws only apply to types
the same event, decision to buy tomato puree, falls under neurological type N and to set of movements P
there isn�t a law relating mental event M to movements P
variable realisation � decision to buy tomato puree = neuro type A, tomorrow = neuro event type B
token (not type) identity theory
just because there are mental-physical laws, may not generalise to the mental events behind
e.g. front page story about earthquake
inner page story about boulder crushing house
it�s all about the way in which the description picks it out
events are related to descriptions in a one-many way
most criticism directed at 3rd principle
most people can�t see why
seems like an empirical question, not decidable by a priori argument
debate in the literature - does anomalous monism allow the mental causal efficacy?
disagreement Kim/Davidson: fundamentally about mental descriptions
see Kim �The myth of non-reductive materialism� 269:
mental properties have no causal efficacy
claims: the mental events could be swapped around without impinging on the physical
Davidson (Thinking Causes):
refutes Kim�s claim that all the physical events are in fixed causal relations to each other, because he endorses superveniences of the mental on the physical
(though perhaps the causal relations could be changed in an irrelevant way)
Kim: Davidson�s supervenience claims are not strong enough
in order to avert the previous charge, he has to use supervenience, which brings a commitment to psycho-physical laws
Davidson disagrees:
supervenience doesn�t entail psycho-physical laws of the form (every event which is a change from a person�s being p to a person�s being q will be accompanied by a change from that person�s being M to that person�s being N where M and N are physical descriptions) � there will be physical change, but it won�t necessarily be the same change
but doesn�t establish what he needs to establish. doesn�t show that there aren�t any (physico-psycho) laws in the opposite direction (every event which is a change from a person�s being M to a person�s being N will be accompanied by a change in that person�s being p to that person�s being q)
so however good you get at predicting physical events in physical terms, including neurophysiology, still would not be able to describe/predict what that would feel like in mental terms � Kim�s charge is that a strong enough supervenience commits him to just this (lawlike connections (physico-psycho laws) upwards from physical to mental)
aren�t mental events tokens that can�t be formed into types?
a type identity theory would be positing laws in both directions (massively disjunctive physical type)
Kim: supervenience dictates that if you have two physically indistinguishable systems, and identical physical change, then will change in identical mental state
Blackburn � Spreading the word (ch 5/6???)
B = base language, A = supervenient
B*/A supervenience (weak supervenience)
if you�ve got 2 systems which are physically indistinguishable, will also be mentally/morally/modally indistinguishable
leaves open the possibility in another world of something being B* but not A � it�s only if you�ve got B* already ???
B*/A necessity (strong supervenience)
can�t have something that�s B* but not A
being B* necessitates A in any nomological world you like
N (($x)(B*x & x) � (("y)(B*y � A�y))
N ("y)(B*y �A�y)
N = necessary
weak supervenience is weird unless you accept strong supervenience
but makes sense if you�re a non-realist about the A facts
moral: can have weak without strong because it�s moral requirement to treat like alike (consistency in our practice)
Davidson could be seen as a non-realist
mentality (intentional states � what we believe/desire/intend/mean), not so much about being in pain, after-images etc.
he thinks that what it is for me to believe that p is for the claim that I do believe in p to figure in the best possible interpretative theory of my behaviour over a period of time
our believe/desire/intend apparatus = best way to see reason
insofar as we can make sense of propositions (S believes that P) is for them to figure in the best possible interpretative theory of my behaviour over a period of time
monism = there aren�t any particulars that aren�t physical
though there are irreducible mental events
event = central category
most people are substance monists insofar as they don�t believe in Cartesian souls
event dualism = can�t identify mental events with physical
attribute dualist = can�t come up with a set of physical properties which determine that a scene is beautiful, for instance
weak supervenience = implicit relativisation to a given community
imposed by, not inherent in
2 sources of physical similarity and mental difference = the world or us
if it�s located in us, then the world can tolerate a physical thing which is not a mental way, but we can�t
but if it�s not the world�s business anyway, then you need incompatible set of interpreters
secondary qualities
intentionality
eliminative materialism
are there non-physical mental events? mental-mental events don�t have physical descriptions, and then suddenly do?
token identity theory
epiphenomenalism (re: Kim�s original charge)
what should I read of Davidson�s to elucidate mental events
supervenient examples � beauty, mind, morality, modality, truth, sound/objects???